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David R. King
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Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

John D. Driessnack*
MCR LLC,
Arlington, VA

Consolidation of the defense industrial base has led to concerns about
whether enough competition exists between remaining firms to maintain
needed cost reduction and innovation. We examine competition in the U.S.
defense industrial base by performing an in-depth case study of Lockheed
Martin and the F-22 program that considers multiple tiers of the industrial
base. We find that defense firm specialization has led to outsourcing practices
and arguably a more robust U.S. defense industrial base. Implications for
government policy are identified. (JEL H57, O38, D43, L14)

I. Introduction
In the last decade, significant change has swept the defense
industrial base. U.S. defense budgets related to the procurement of
weapon systems fell by more than 65% in real terms following the end
of the Cold War (Perry, 1993). Defense firms responded to decreased
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defense spending by either exiting the industry or concentrating their
operations within the defense industry (Augustine, 1997; Deutch,
2001). The defense industry consolidation has resulted in primarily
three firms, Boeing, Lockheed Martin (LM), and Northrop Grumman,
serving as prime contractors to the U.S. government for major weapon
systems. The move toward an oligopoly of defense firms has led to
concerns about the level of competition (e.g., Birkler et al., 2003;
Kovacic, 1999) and is recognized as an area requiring further research
(Lorell, 2003).
Government policy is an integral part of the structure of the
defense industrial base as the government plays both the role of
regulator and the only customer (Sapolsky and Gholz, 1999). A policy
implication related to the consolidation of defense firms is that it has
diminished the viability of some traditional methods of government
oversight. Specifically, the impact of barring prime contractors from
government work may be untenable. Quite simply, the impact of
excluding prime contractors from defense contracts for misconduct,
even temporarily, could be counterproductive when it eliminates the
only available firm to meet a given requirement. For example, a
suspension of Boeing’s space division for military contracts was waived
multiple times, since it was the only firm that could provide space
launch services in the required time frames (Merle, 2003). Still, as a
result of identified transgressions, Boeing will lose approximately $1
billion in business and gain a stronger competitor in the space business
as LM rebuilds its space launch capabilities (Wong, 2003).
An important policy question is whether defense industry
consolidation has maintained levels of competition needed to
encourage both cost reduction and innovation (Birkler et al., 2003;
Cole and Squeo, 1999). Some research has questioned whether
competition within the defense industry actually contributes to either
innovation or cost reduction (Birkler et al., 2001; Kovacic and
Smallwood, 1994). For example, innovation in combat aircraft
historically occurs at times of increased demand, emergence of new
component technologies (e.g., engines, guided weapons, radar, and
stealth), and significant changes in government requirements (Lorell,
2003). The goal of the current article is to examine competition in the
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U.S. defense industrial base and make associated recommendations to
address policy concerns.
We define ‘‘defense firms’’ as companies that have established
capabilities and competencies in dealing with the Department of
Defense. The defense industry is a niche market in that it involves
small numbers where both buyers and suppliers have significant
bargaining power. Defense firms have developed a scarce competence
in dealing with a monopsony customer with regulatory oversight
(Driessnack and King, 2004). The scarcity of this competence can be
readily observed as foreign firms and firms not accustomed to defense
procurement teaming with defense firms when competing for a new
U.S. Navy shipbuilding contract (Squeo, 2003).
Although an important sector of a nation’s economy, it is
difficult to perform empirical analysis of the defense industry (Anton
and Yao, 1990). The difficulty in performing research on the defense
industry has resulted in existing defense industry research exhibiting
multiple shortcomings. One shortcoming of existing research is that
studies often do not go beyond prime contractors, or the largest firms
within the defense industry (e.g., Birkler et al., 2003), when the role
of small firms in industries, in general, (King et al., 2003) and the
defense industry, in particular (Squeo, 2002), has been recognized as
important.1 To overcome the challenge of performing meaningful
research in the defense industry, we perform a case study (e.g.,
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994).
Applying a case study methodology provides an opportunity to
explore competition in the defense industry in a way that adapts to the
context of a small numbers market. Specifically, a case study allows
examining the interaction among the defense prime contractors and
their suppliers within the defense market. We use transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1975) as the foundation for our examination of
the defense industry. By considering the exchanges within a firm and
its external partners, we are able to consider conditions that fall
outside the classic assumptions of a competitive market. In collecting
information on the defense industry, we focus our attention on the
fighter aircraft industry.
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Fighter aircraft production requires capabilities above general
aerospace manufacturing with increased technological demands for
materials, avionics, engines, and systems integration that push the
limits of design and engineering knowledge (King and Nowack, 2003).
Additionally, aircraft programs involve technology development that is
sensitive to both changes in technology and defense funding.
Technological change has led to a periodic change in the number of
firms competing for fighter aircraft development and to changes in the
firm that has tended to win those contracts. For example, after
emphasis shifted to avionics and guided missiles in the 1960s,
McDonnell established leadership with its F-4 and F-15 aircrafts
(Simonson, 1968). LM became the current industry leader, after
it developed innovative stealth technology first used with the F-117
stealth fighter (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) that has been subsequently
applied to F-22 and F-35 aircraft. However, there have been no new
entrants into manned U.S. aircraft production since World War II, and
the award of the last two U.S. fighter programs (i.e., the F-22 and F35) to LM has heightened concerns about what can be expected from a
dwindling number of potential aircraft suppliers.
Whether surviving defense firms will sustain competition and
innovation in fighter aircraft design and production remains an open
question. Part of the U.S. Cold War military strategy was to use
technology to counter the vast size of the Soviet military (Kitfield,
1995). While only the United States currently operates stealth aircraft,
Russia and Japan are reportedly working on developing stealth aircraft
(Lambeth, 1996), so continued technological leadership by the United
States in fighter aircraft technology requires continued innovation.
Since the leadership of LM in fighter aircraft is representative of
concerns about competition in the defense industry, we perform an indepth examination of LM’s F-22 program. Before performing that
examination, we outline our application of transaction cost economics.

II. Theoretical Foundation
Transaction cost economics (North, 1990; Williamson, 1975)
holds that managers choose the least costly method of organizing.
Market exchange is generally considered more efficient than
internalizing transactions, as it allows parties of a transaction to be
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competitively selected and drives the most efficient pricing for buyers
and suppliers. However, Williamson (1975) suggests that market
failure precludes market exchange and drives internalization of
exchanges within a firm. Williamson (1975, 39–40) originally outlined
five situations that involve market failure:








Bounded rationality: human beings tend to search for adequate
and not optimum solutions,
Uncertainty/complexity: conditions without readily discernable
patterns or manageable number of interactions that would
facilitate decision making,
Information impactedness: information asymmetry involving
situations where one party is better informed than the other,
making contractual arrangements difficult or expensive to
verify,
Opportunism: power imbalances that allow one party of a
contractual relationship to pursue self-interests, and/or
Small numbers: reduction in business choices resulting from
limited quantities of either buyers or suppliers.

Later, a sixth market failure involving ‘‘asset specificity,’’ or a
condition created from recurring transactions that creates
progressively stronger bilateral relationships, was identified
(Williamson, 1979).
The defense industry, with a limited number of suppliers and a
single, government buyer, represents a small numbers market that
would normally disband due to market pressures (i.e., new entrants).
However, government procurement regulations, designed to minimize
the potential for defense contractor opportunism, act as an entry
barrier that results in newcomers and small firms teaming with
defense firms that are familiar with defense procurement. Additional
entry barriers relate to the level of technology capability required
and the requirement for government security clearances to participate
in the market. For example, building the necessary skills and
supporting infrastructure to support entry into technological
demanding markets such as fighter aircraft can take decades (King
and Nowack, 2003).
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The role of defense prime contractors has evolved over time and
increasingly involves providing ‘‘system integration,’’ or a coordinating
role to ensure subsystems operate effectively together in an overall
weapon system. Systems integration is crucial to fielding effective
weapon systems within a reasonable time at an affordable price. In the
past, the U.S. government provided selected subsystems as
government finished equipment, and at times, the government acted
as the final systems integrator. For example, the government played
an active role in the integration of systems on the B-1B bomber.
However, changing technology and increased reliance by the
government on commercial practices has transferred the role of
integrating subsystems to major defense firms (Lorell et al., 2000). At
the same time, the increased emphasis on cost in a post–Cold War
environment has contributed to major defense firms to allocate
increased technical and financial responsibility to their suppliers.
The combined impact of increased integration responsibilities
and sharing of risk is a distribution of work within a technology market
(i.e., Arora et al., 2001). This can be observed in an increased use of
teaming by defense firms (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994) (see Figure
1). Additionally, the amount of work performed by defense prime
contractors in-house has decreased over time. For example, in the
early 1960s, aircraft firms performed approximately 45% of work inhouse (Hall and Johnson, 1968). Currently, LM with the F-22 contract
performs 25% of the work in-house, or roughly half the work that was
performed in-house on earlier programs.2
The transaction costs associated with the difficulty of exchanges
between prime contractors working to integrate subsystems into a
working weapon system helps determine the governance structure the
prime contractor uses to develop and produce a weapon system. The
more problematic a transaction, the more likely it will be internalized
(Williamson, 1975). Less problematic transactions, where technical
and financial risk can be shared, will lead to closer supplier
relationships, such as alliances or joint ventures. However, long-term
relationships are expensive to maintain, so organizations tend to have
no more partners than necessary (Humphries and Wilding, 2001).
Meanwhile, market-driven exchanges allow greater competition for
part and component suppliers, and a greater number of potential
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suppliers will allow a prime contractor to either identify preferred
suppliers or use full-and-open competition. The anticipated impact of
transaction costs on a prime contractor’s governance structure of a
weapon system is shown in Figure 2.

III. LM F-22 Raptor
A. Background
The initial requirement for an Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) to
replace the F-15 Eagle was identified by the Air Force in 1981, and, in
1985, seven manufacturers were awarded initial concept definition
contracts (Wall Street Journal, 1985). The field of seven was later
narrowed to two contractor teams for building ATF prototypes with a
partnership of Lockheed, General Dynamics (GD), and Boeing on one
team and Northrop and McDonnell Douglas on the other (Charles,
1987). A competitive fly-off of the competing designs with Lockheed’s
YF-22, emphasizing maneuverability, and Northrop’s YF-23,
emphasizing stealth and speed, was used to determine the winner of
the ATF development contract (Wartzman, 1991).
Formal teaming in the ATF competition allowed firms to share
the risk of developing a prototype, and, in 1991, the Lockheed-led
team won the ATF design competition (Schine, 1991). The F-22 design
incorporated multiple technology advances, including super cruise (the
ability to exceed the speed of sound without using afterburner) and
vectored thrust engines, providing improved maneuverability.3
Lockheed subsequently acquired GD’s aircraft division for $1.52 billion,
in 1993, procuring its portion of the F-22 contract and F-16 production
(Wall Street Journal, 1993). The GD acquisition increased Lockheed’s
share of the F-22 program to 67.5%, while Boeing maintained a
32.5% share. After winning the design competition, the F-22 program
entered Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) with a
focus on establishing a stable, cost-effective design that further
validates system capabilities through testing.
During EMD, the F-22 program experienced several noteworthy
events. Although delayed due to minor technology problems common
to new aircraft development, the first flight of an F-22 took place on
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September 7, 1997 from Lockheed’s Marietta, GA, facility (Kandebo,
1997). The F-22 program experienced additional turbulence because of
concerns over the cost of having three aircraft programs (i.e., F-22, F35, and F/A-18E/F) under development at the same time, leading to
the F-22 program to experience political criticism. For example, in
1999, the House of Representatives voted to eliminate funding for the
F-22 program (Squeo, 2003).4 Most recently, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review reviewed and reversed recent reductions to F-22
procurement (King, 2006). Further, the F-22 program has recently met
several milestones, including Full Rate Production (April 2005), Initial
Operational Capability (December 2006), EMD completion (March
2006).

B. Governance Structure
From the beginning of the F-22 program, LM took a
collaborative approach to ensure that their ATF design was the most
competitive, with Boeing having considerable experience with
integrating avionics systems (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994) and
composite materials (Lorell, 2003) and GD having the most recent
production experience with the literally thousands of F-16 aircraft
produced.
The distribution of work across Boeing and the divisions
ofLMdoes not explain the extent of the industrial base supporting F-22
development and production. Other firms in the defense market make
significant contributions with over 1100 suppliers in more than 40
states supporting the F-22 program.5 The result—less work is
performed by LM and Boeing on the F-22 than would generally be
assumed. This facilitates a division of innovative labor and allows firms
to exploit industry-wide economies of scale in technology (e.g., Arora
et al., 2001).
LM’s formal corporate policy on ‘‘make or buy’’ decisions
involves the application of competitive principles in order to make
‘‘best-value’’ decisions and does not provide preferential treatment to
LM business units. Development of major F-22 subsystems was
competed by Lockheed during the ATF competition. Key ATF suppliers
were carried over from the prototype phase to EMD based on a
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competition sensitivity analysis performed by LM. Major subsystems
were designated as sole source based on cost or the complexity of the
work. These observations are consistent with our framework that
exchanges on the F-22 program are driven by transaction costs. The
actual distribution of work on the F-22 program is shown in Figure 3,
and it shows that LM acts as the final systems integrator, performing a
minority of work on billable materials. Billable materials represent the
summation of all supplier costs (i.e., raw material, recurring labor,
direct product engineering, factory support, overhead, general and
administrative, and profit) to the prime contractor that performs final
assembly. Using this measure allows examining relationships below
the prime contractor level that have not been examined in extant
research.
Internalized Transactions. Fighter aircraft manufacture is
demanding, and work retained by LM entails complex tasks. Only a
quarter of work on the F-22 program has been kept internal to LM,
with retained work primarily involving core competencies based on
stealth technology and manufacture of major structural components
(see Figure 4).6 Additionally, Lockheed7 acted to internalize key fighter
production capability with its acquisition of GD’s aircraft division, in
1993.
Though initially criticized as a potential misstep (Cole, 1994),
there is little doubt that the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division
enhanced LM’s capabilities as a defense firm and had a positive impact
on LM’s subsequent cash flow and earnings. Through the acquisition
of GD’s aircraft division, Lockheed gained access to an additional
32.5% of the F-22 contract and to F-16 aircraft contracts. Based on
the dollar value of current and planned F-22 contract awards, it is
estimated that LM will or has received an additional $10.5 billion in
cash flows resulting from the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division.
Additionally, since 1993, LM has been awarded $13 billion in F-16
contracts by U.S. and foreign governments and is expected to gain up
to $5 billion in cash flows related to sustaining F-16 U.S. military
operations through 2018. For a $1.52 billion investment, LM gained
access to cash flows valued at $1.6 billion.8 In addition to benefiting
LM, it is also reasonable that the acquisition benefited the defense
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industrial base by reducing surplus capacity and putting excess
resources to more productive work (Duetch, 2001).
Long-Term Relationships. Competition has forced prime
contractors to specialize their technology portfolios and develop
strategic alliances with other firms that can more efficiently provide
needed products and expertise. LM continues to maintain a long-term
teaming relationship with Boeing for F-22 aircraft, where Boeing is
responsible for the F-22’s avionics and the manufacture of F-22 wings
and rear fuselage (see Figure 4). The management of Boeing’s F-22
work is similar to LM and is consistent with minimizing transaction
costs. For example, the manufacturing of wings for the F-22
represents a complex, labor-intensive process in that involves building
a web of carbon fiber and titanium spars by hand (Gates, 2003);
therefore, Boeing performs this work internally at its Seattle plant.
However, Boeing also uses external suppliers to streamline production
and ensure costs remain competitive.
For its share of the F-22 contract, Boeing distributes work
between itself and suppliers (see Figure 3). In comparison to total F22 billable materials, Boeing only performs 12% of F-22 work
internally, and an additional 14.3% goes to Boeing’s strategic
suppliers. Boeing’s largest subcontract representing 5.3% of F-22
billable materials was awarded to a Northrop Grumman and Raytheon
team to build the F-22 radar. Boeing also competitively awards 5.8%
of F-22 billable materials to suppliers.
Single-Source Suppliers. LM has developed relationships with
key suppliers with eight out of the ‘‘top 10’’ F-22 subcontractors
representing competitive selection of sole-source suppliers. For
example, BAE supplies the electronic warfare system for the F-22 and
Northrop Grumman supplies the F-22’s navigation system, which
represent 5.7% and 5.0% of billable materials on the F-22,
respectively. Together, the top 10 F-22 subcontractors perform
roughly 18% of the billable materials on F-22 production.
Both BAE and Northrop Grumman supply LM subsystems for the
F-22 and the F-35. For example, Northrop Grumman performs around
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10% of the work on the F-22 radar under Boeing and the F-22
navigation system for LM, even though it lost the ATF competition
and the company represents a competitor to both LM and Boeing.
Additionally, Northrop Grumman has a 20% share of the work on the
F-35 program led by LM (Lorell, 2003). An implication of LM selecting
the most competitive suppliers on major subsystems for its aircraft
programs is that it helps maintain the market for technology in the
defense industry.
Competition. Consistent with transaction cost theory,LMuses
competition for general material (e.g., sheet metal, machined parts,
and electromechanical hardware) that involve less
uncertainty/complexity and where multiple suppliers exist. When only
considering the F-22 prime defense contractors, close to 17% of
billable materials for F-22 production is competed on an on-going basis
(see Figure 3). Including work performed by additional tiers of the
defense industrial base would only increase the amount of work on F22 production that is still exposed to market forces.
LM has used innovative approaches to ensuring competition,
where appropriate. For example, LM has embraced electronic
commerce to ensure competed work is awarded at the lowest possible
cost through improved information flow. Although skepticism about
applying electronic commerce to the aerospace industry have been
voiced (Mecham, 2001), LM in a single example of employing a
reverse auction online saved over $2.2 million in material costs as
their electronic marketplace led to reduced prices through competitive
forces.

IV. Conclusion
Even though the government awarded the F-22 contract to LM,
winning the contract required that LM team with other defense
contractors to offer the best performance at the lowest price. Further,
the government’s continuous emphasis on cost has driven competition
into the F-22 program. Figure 3 shows that LM and Boeing compete
16.9% of F-22 work—a number that would be higher if additional
competition held by subcontractors was included.
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Simply assuming that a greater number of defense firms in the
past resulted in greater competition may not be valid. First, the ability
of defense firms to charge unreasonable prices is checked by the
government’s role as both the sole customer and regulator. In fact,
there is no reason to conclude that the level of competition in the
defense industry has decreased or that costs charged to the
government are not fair and reasonable, as analysis indicates that
defense firms exhibit lower financial performance than commercial
firms (Bowlin, 1999). Second, it could be argued that the level of
competition in past fighter programs was actually lower. For example,
only four defense firms competed for the F-15 contract that was
awarded without a competitive fly-off (King and Massey, 1997), while
seven firms competed for the F-22 contract that was awarded after a
competitive fly-off. Third, advancing technology and specialization has
required teaming between defense firms so they can offer the most
competitive design solutions and share risk. This suggests that it may
be more reasonable to say that the level of competition in the defense
industry has increased because its market for technology is more
developed.
The end result of specialization by surviving defense firms and
current teaming and outsourcing practices is arguably a more robust
U.S. defense industrial base (Heinrich, 2002). A side effect of
increased teaming is that a greater number of firms gain experience
dealing with key technologies, such as stealth, increases competition
for subsequent contracts (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994). Therefore,
even though the number of prime defense firms has decreased
overtime, competition still exists as remaining firms compete for a
larger share of procurement efforts at the second tier and below.

A. Policy Implications
Policy makers need to realize that applying the classic
assumptions of a competitive marketplace with multiple buyers and
sellers to the defense industry will result in suspect policy
recommendations (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) and could have
consequences other than those intended (King and Driessnack, 2003).
For example, policy recommendations to shore up competition by
maintaining two sources of supply may be misguided. For example, a

Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007): pg. 57-66. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

12

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

recent RAND study examining whether to maintain two suppliers for
the F-35 program concluded that the cost associated with that option
would outweigh any anticipated benefits (Birkler et al., 2001). Instead
of a fixating on maintaining a second source of supply for weapons
systems, policy makers may be better served by focusing on
competition within the market for technology within the defense
industry.
Our findings indicate that policy makers in evaluating the
efficiency of transactions (i.e., cost-effectiveness) should use a
transaction cost perspective that considers the structure of the defense
market and related transaction costs and then consider whether any
feasible, superior alternatives exist (Williamson, 1985). Ensuring work
is delegated to appropriate tiers of the defense industrial base will help
maintain needed competition and innovation, while allowing prime
contractors to leverage their core capabilities of systems integration
and interfacing with a government customer at reduced overall cost.
Additionally, history indicates that innovation is sustained as
long as credible rival firms (Lorell, 2003) or technologies are present.
The emergence of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) may represent a
new innovation that may change the structure of the defense industry.
For example, after the initial market entry by General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems with Predator, in 1994, the market for
unmanned aircraft is expected to reach $10 billion (Johnson, 2003). It
is reasonable to expect that vigorous competition will transform the
leadership of the aircraft industry with new entrants competing for
future UAV development projects (Birkler et al., 2003). Policy makers
need to encourage the development of rival technology to maintain
competition and innovation.

B. Summary
Researchers (e.g., Quinn, 2000; Womack et al., 1990) have
identified outsourcing as a means for firms to achieve faster and lower
cost innovation, as long as managers focus on their firm’s core
competencies and have established outsourcing management
practices. Prime contractors in the defense industry and LM, in
particular, appear to have taken this information and made it central
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to their business strategy. We find that LM has focused on leveraging
its core capabilities and experience of interfacing with its government
customer in managing F-22 contracts. Specifically, LM focuses on
manufacture, integration, and final assembly of aircraft, while
outsourcing other systems through teaming (e.g., Boeing and F-22
avionics), supplier relationships, or competition. The defense firms
specializing in integration are decreasing costs by increasing the level
of competition and innovation in the defense industry through
increased outsourcing, and government policy should encourage its
continued practice on the F-22 and other programs.
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Notes
In fiscal year 2003, LM exceeded government on small business mandates
by awarding over 5% of the dollar value of F-22 work to small
businesses on 500 procurement actions.
2
The authors were provided in-depth access to information on LM’s
subcontract management.
3
The F-22’s F119 engine is provided by Pratt & Whitney as government
finished equipment and is not included in our analysis.
4
The threat of program cancellation has acted as an incentive to lower
program costs. This is not an idle threat as major programs such as
the Navy’s A-12 and the Army’s Crusader weapon systems have been
cancelled due to cost overruns and changing requirements respectively
(e.g., Jaffe et al., 2002; Pasztor, 1991).
5
LM contracts with approximately 600 subcontractors while Boeing contracts
with roughly 500 subcontractors.
6
LM manufactures the mid- and forward fuselage and performs final assembly
of the F-22 aircraft.
7
At the time of the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division, Lockheed’s merger
with Martin Marietta, which resulted in the current firm name of
Lockheed Martin, was still to come.
8
The value of anticipated cash flows was calculated with a discount rate of
3.95% using the procedure described by Copeland (2000) with the
exception that operating income is estimated to be 12% of cash flows,
as the U.S. government limits the profit earned on defense contracts.
1

Abbreviations
ATF: Advanced Tactical Fighter
EMD: Engineering Manufacturing and Development
GD: General Dynamics
LM: Lockheed Martin
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
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Figure 1
Teaming of Aircraft Prime Contractors by Program.
Updated from Birkler et al., 2003
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Figure 4
Distribution of Work on F-22 Production

Source: LM Corporation.
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